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Abstract 
The change of government in 2010 provoked a large structural change in the English 
education landscape. Unexpectedly, the new government offered primary schools the chance 
to have ‘the freedom and the power to take control of their own destiny’, with better 
performing schools given a green light to fast track convert to become an academy school. In 
England, schools that become academies have more freedom over many ways in which they 
operate, including curriculum design, budgets, staffing issues and the shape of the academic 
year. However, the change to allow primary school academisation has been controversial. 
This paper reports estimates of the causal effect of academy enrolment on primary school 
pupils. While the international literature provides growing evidence on the effect of school 
autonomy in a variety of contexts, little is known about the effect of autonomy on primary 
schools (which are typically much smaller than secondary schools) and in contexts where the 
converting school is not deemed to be failing or disadvantaged. The key findings are that 
English primary schools did change their mode of operation after the exogenous policy 
change, utilising more autonomy and changing spending behaviour, but this did not lead to 
improved pupil performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2010, the educational landscape in England has radically altered. By 2017, nearly two-
thirds of secondary schools and over a fifth of primary schools are academies. Academy 
schools are granted considerable operational autonomy by government and have a battery of 
freedoms they can use that standard state schools cannot. As Michael Gove, the Minister then 
responsible for education, put it by enabling academisation these schools have been ‘given 
the freedom and the power to take control of their own destiny’.1  
Although academies were present before then – principally as a school improvement 
policy for underperforming secondary schools since 2002 - the programme was radically 
altered and significantly expanded following the election of the new UK government in May 
2010. It became a school structure to which all schools were invited to aspire as enabling 
legislation – the Academies Act of 2010 - was rapidly put in place two months after the 
election of the new government.
2
 For the first time, and through this completely unexpected 
policy change
3
, primary schools were invited to become academies, with better performing 
schools being given priority to convert. The first batch of such schools converted in the 
school year beginning in September 2010. This paper reports estimates of the impact of 
primary school conversion to academy status on their operation and on the performance of 
enrolled pupils. 
 This introduction of primary academies took place in an international context where 
publicly-funded, autonomous schools have become a familiar form of school improvement 
                                                          
1
 Department for Education (2013). Forward by Michael Gove MP. 
2
 Most new academies since 2010 are ‘converters’. However, some academies are sponsored (i.e. managed by a 
private team of independent co-sponsors) and these are schools that have been underperforming. The effect of 
academisation on these schools (which are closer to the original New Labour academies, studied by Eyles and 
Machin, 2015, and comprise about 30 percent of primary academies) is not considered in this paper, because we 
want to explore the unexpected dimension of academisation that applied to converters, and especially those 
rated outstanding prior to the 2010 change in policy. 
3
 The introduction of ‘Free schools’ and education reform were issues raised in the manifesto of the new 
government prior to their election; however, there was no mention of large-scale expansion of the academies 
programme. Free schools are completely new schools that can be set up by interested parties (e.g. parents, or 
community members). By 2016/17, there were 139 free primary schools open or approved.  
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policy, most notably through charter schools in the US and free schools in Sweden. Research 
on the former tends to find achievement gains associated with charter status and with the 
‘injection’ of charter school features to public schools, particularly in urban settings where 
the schools typically enrol disadvantaged students.
4
 In the Swedish context, there is some 
evidence of positive short and long term effects of the free school program, but these are 
found to work primarily through competition (see Bolhmark and Lindahl, 2015). 
The policy studied here differs from most others in the literature in three important 
respects. Firstly, it involves conversion of existing schools rather than the creation of new 
schools.
5
 Secondly, it is about the voluntary conversion of better performing schools and not 
the forced conversion of failing schools. These better performing schools very clearly have a 
lower proportion of children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Thirdly, the focus is on young 
children (aged 7-11) who attend primary schools, which are much smaller than secondary 
schools.
6
 Although there have been studies of elementary schools in the charter school 
context, these are less prevalent than studies of middle and high schools. Similarly, studies of 
autonomy in the context of the English education system have focused on  particular subsets 
of secondary schools; specifically, advantaged secondary schools voluntarily gaining greater 
autonomy (Clark, 2009),  disadvantaged secondary schools (Eyles and Machin, 2015), and 
                                                          
4
 Epple, Romano and Zimmer (2016) provide an overview of the literature. While something of a consensus has 
emerged, there is also some controversy within the charter school research. Recent experimental studies of 
charters in or near particular US cities (Boston and New York) find positive impacts on educational 
achievement (see Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, 2014; Angrist et al. 2010, 2013; Dobbie and Fryer 2011, 2013; 
Hoxby and Murarka 2009). Wider coverage evaluations have produced more mixed results (Betts et al. 2006; 
Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2009, 2013; Gleason et al.  2010). Similarly, there is no consensus 
on the longer term effects of charters. Angrist et al. (2016) and Dobbie and Fryer (2014) fine that charter 
attendance improves longer run outcomes such as college attendance. In later work, Dobbie and Fryer (2016) 
find negative earnings returns for those attending charters that are ineffective at raising test scores and no returns 
for charters that are successful at raising test scores.  
5
 While the majority of school autonomy studies focus on newly set up autonomous schools (e.g. the majority of 
US charters are new schools), there are some examples of studies where existing schools become more 
autonomous. Clark (2009) and Eyles and Machin (2015) study English secondary schools gaining more 
autonomy, while Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016) study the conversion of traditional public schools in New Orleans 
to (in-district) charters. Alongside these Steinberg (2014) studies the granting of greater operational freedom to 
a subset of principals in already existing Chicago Public Schools. 
6
 While the majority of charter papers focus on middle and high schools, some papers do include results for 
elementary schools (Dobbie and Fryer 2011, 2013; and Hoxby et al. 2009).  
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secondary schools in relatively disadvantaged local authorities (e.g. Birmingham in the case 
of Bertoni et al., 2017). 
 Upon conversion, academy schools gain autonomy over many process and personnel 
decisions. This greater freedom may have positive effects on student outcomes because of 
superior information held by local decision makers (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). 
Indeed, the first secondary schools in England to become academies (in the early 2000s) did 
seem to deliver positive effects on student outcomes (Eyles and Machin, 2015; and Eyles at 
al. 2016a, 2016b). However, the context was one in which a couple of hundred (previously 
significantly underperforming) secondary schools became academies. It is not necessarily the 
case that these positive effects carry through to better performing schools and/or to (much 
smaller) primary schools.  
If the autonomy offered within the academies model was unambiguously 
advantageous for schools, one would imagine that all schools would want to become 
academies. However, recently the UK government has had to back out of a policy to force all 
schools in England to become academies by the end of 2022 because of fierce hostility to this 
by the educational establishment (although the current government vision is still to encourage 
all schools to become academies).  
Whether such radical upheaval is in the interests of students is an empirical question. 
Most schools yet to convert are primary schools, which represent the vast majority of schools 
in England. One might hypothesise that schools which volunteered to convert to academy 
status early-on are those that were most amenable to academy status, anticipating positive 
benefits. If effects are not found for such schools, one might question whether it is such a 
good idea to extend it to schools that are less enthusiastic. 
An important feature of the policy being studied here is that it was in no way 
anticipated by schools or parents. This gives leverage to identify causal effects since the 
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conversion was exogenous to pupils already enrolled in the school. Thus, the sample studied 
is restricted to these “legacy enrolled” pupils who can be observed before and after 
academisation takes place. The importance of estimating effects for pupils who were already 
enrolled in the school prior to conversion emerges because student mobility post-conversion 
is potentially endogenous to the policy itself. For example, parents may be attracted by the 
idea of academy status and be more likely to enrol their students to newly converted primary 
schools. Exit from the school post-conversion might also be non-random (for example, if 
schools change policies in a way that is less attractive to certain students or their parents). 
However, in the empirical work discussed below, a very strong first stage estimate (of the 
effect of pre-conversion enrolment on the probability of attending an academy) suggests that 
a causal effect of academy attendance is identified for the majority of eligible pupils in the 
school.  
In practical terms, the empirical strategy adopted in this paper first involves selection 
of treatment and control groups of schools. The treatment group consists of primary schools 
that converted to academy status between 2010/11 and 2014/15. In each case, the control 
groups are those that converted in later academic years, but before 2016/17. Under certain 
conditions, these treatment and control schools are shown to have similar pre-trends in 
outcome variables. Further, enrolment in the primary school prior to conversion is used as an 
instrument for actual attendance in the academy in grade 6 when national tests in reading and 
maths take place. The legacy enrolment strategy mirrors that used in Eyles and Machin 
(2015) in their study of the first underperforming English secondary schools to become 
academies in the early 2000s. It also draws on Fryer (2014) who looks at the effect of 
injecting charter school practices into traditional public schools and Abdulkadiroglu et al. 
(2016), who study school takeovers in New Orleans, referring to pupils who stay in 
converting schools as ‘grand-fathered’ pupils 
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes primary education in 
England and offers a discussion of the institutional features characterising the introduction of 
academy schools.  Section 3 describes the data and research strategy. Section 4 reports results 
from the first part of the empirical analysis, looking at whether primary schools that became 
academies did in fact change their mode of operation upon conversion. Section 5 report the 
legacy enrolment results looking at causal effects of academy conversion on pupil 
performance. Conclusions are given in Section 6. 
 
2.  Primary Education in England and Academy Schools 
Primary Education 
In England, children start school in the September after they reach the age of 4. Most children 
attend a primary school up to age 11, after which they go to secondary school.
7
  Schooling in 
England is organised into Key Stages. At the end of Key Stage 1 (age 7), pupils are assessed 
by their teachers in English and maths according to national guidelines. At the end of Key 
Stage 2 (age 11), they undertake national tests in English and maths.
8
 These tests are used to 
construct Performance Tables for primary schools, which are publicly available. There is next 
to no grade repetition within the system. 
 Up until the introduction of academies in 2010, schooling had been organised at the 
local level into Local Education Authorities (LEAs). There are 152 LEAs in England and 
around 15,000 primary schools. The LEA main functions in relation to primary schools are in 
building and maintaining schools, providing support services (e.g. for children with special 
needs), and acting in an advisory role to the head teacher regarding school performance and 
implementation of government initiatives.  
                                                          
7
 There is a small number of infant schools and middle schools in parts of the country. They are not included in 
this analysis unless they are ‘linked’, meaning that students at an infant school are prioritised for places at the 
junior school; in these cases, the proportion of infant school attendees switching to the linked junior school is 
very high and the two linked schools are treated as though they were one single school.   
8
 Prior to 2010, students were also assessed in science.  
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LEAs also have an important role in the funding allocations of schools. The bulk of 
schools funding comes from the dedicated schools grant which is given to LEAs and then 
distributed according to the each LEAs own funding formula. The funding allocated to the 
LEA is based on a historically determined formula which is mainly driven by the numbers of 
pupils, ‘additional educational needs’ and local conditions. These local conditions include 
population sparsity, measures of deprivation, and wage costs in the area (Roberts and Bolton, 
2017).  
As well as allocating funding, the LEA also appoints one or two representatives on to 
a school’s governing body – a group of parents, teachers and community representatives that 
provides governance to the school. LEAs typically offer a number of administrative and 
management functions including training, personnel and financial services. Up until the 
2010/11 school year, the majority of primary aged pupils (67%) attended community schools 
in which LEAs are the statutory employer of school staff, owner of the buildings and the 
authority that manages student admissions.
9
 Most other state primary schools are faith 
schools (which have greater autonomy from the LEA). Although parents can apply to send 
their child to any primary school (i.e. there are no strict catchment areas), popular schools are 
often oversubscribed and places are rationed according to a Schools Admissions Code.
10
  
Academy Schools 
When a school becomes an academy, it is governed outside the LEA and is overseen 
and funded directly by central government. An academy school is run in many ways like a 
company, where governors are classed as trustees or directors and the principal/head teacher 
is the chief executive. Strong financial management and governance at the level of the 
                                                          
9
 For more information about the operation of primary schools and local government prior to 2010, see Gibbons 
et al. (2011). 
10
 The School Admissions code applies to all state-maintained schools and academies. In practice, schools have 
very little scope to employ differing admission criteria (all schools aside from community schools and a limited 
amount of religious schools, where the LEA determines the criteria, set their own). All schools have to accept 
applications unless they are oversubscribed. In the case of oversubscription the criteria that schools can use is 
limited (distance, presence of sibling at school) and the adopted criteria tends to vary little across schools.  
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individual academy are very important (National Audit Office, 2012), especially given that 
oversight is no longer provided by the LEA. Unlike Community Schools (i.e. most state 
primary schools), academies manage their own admissions. While they still have to adhere to 
the Schools Admissions Code, they may choose to run their admissions policy differently 
than in the past. Although academies are required to teach a broad and balanced curriculum, 
including English, maths, science and religious education, they are not legally required to use 
the national curriculum. They have the ability to set their own pay and conditions for staff 
and more freedom in their hiring decisions (e.g. they may hire unqualified teachers).
11
 
Although academies are supposed to be funded on an equal basis with non-academies, they 
do get extra funds to cover the services that the LEA provides freely to other state maintained 
schools
12
; therefore, they have greater freedom on how to use the budget allocation. They 
also have the responsibility of organising payroll functions, insurance and accountancy 
functions in-house or by contracting this out. Academies also have the ability to change the 
length of the school day and the shape of the academic year (through term times).  
 In the interests of minimising risk following the Academies Act of 2010, the 
Department of Education adopted a phased approach to the criteria for schools wishing to 
convert (National Audit Office, 2012), prioritising and buying a green light in the conversion 
process to better performing schools. A key component of this prioritising decision featured 
the rating in the reports of the Schools Inspectorate (Ofsted) that visits schools every 3-5 
years and rates schools on a four point scale ranging from ‘outstanding’ to ‘unsatisfactory’. 
At the time, about 20% of schools were rated as ‘outstanding’ and 50% as ‘good’.  
The coalition government initially prioritised schools rated as outstanding and fast-
tracked their applications for conversion. The first such schools were converted to academy 
status in September 2010. In November of the same year, this fast track route was extended to 
                                                          
11
 Those with qualified teacher status typically have an undergraduate degree and have completed a one year 
postgraduate teacher training course. 
12
 Schools are given a £25,000 grant to support the conversion process. 
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all good schools with outstanding features. At the same time, recognising the potential for 
economies of scale, academies were also encouraged to convert in chains or undertake some 
post-conversion collaborative arrangement with other schools. This option was made 
available for any school (irrespective of Ofsted grade) if it joined an academy trust with an 
outstanding school or an education partner with a strong record of improvement. In April 
2011, the criteria was further widened to include schools that were ‘performing well’, which 
included consideration of the last three years’ exam results, the latest Ofsted inspections, and 
financial management.  
As shown in Figure 1, the initial take-up rate for primary academies in the first 
possible academic year (2010/11) was modest. This is unsurprising given the unexpected 
nature of the announcement, with legislation being rapidly passed by receiving royal assent in 
June 2010 and the fact that schools are likely to take time before making the decision to take 
on extra responsibilities (especially given the small size of primary schools in England). 
However, after that, there was a huge rise in the number of primary school academies in 
England between 2010/11 and 2016/17, with nearly a quarter of the sector being academy 
schools by 2016/17.  
Following the way in which numbers were constructed for Figure 1, schools are said 
to convert in a given academic school year (September to August) if they are running as an 
academy by December of that academic year. Thus, for example, a school is classed as 
converting to academy status in 2014/15 if it converts at some point during the 2014 calendar 
year.  
The number of schools in the sample of converter academies studied in this paper, by 
year of academy conversion, is given in Table 1. There are a number of reasons for there 
being some discrepancy in numbers between Figure 1 and Table 1. Firstly, because of the 
research design that is adopted, schools are only included in the sample if they have students 
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enrolled in grades 2 and 6 in each academic year between 2006/07 and 2014/15. Secondly, 
the analysis focusses only on academies that voluntarily convert to academy status (around 
30 percent of primary academies are sponsored academies that typically convert to academies 
as a result of government intervention). Thirdly, schools that participated in the KS2 strike of 
2009/10, and who therefore have missing outcome data in that year, are excluded. 
 One further institutional detail of interest is that, in the post-May 2010 phase of 
academisation, schools have also been encouraged to convert in a chain or partnership. The 
Department for Education has stated ‘this can enable schools to support one another once 
they are academies, share resources, experience and ideas. Such an approach is particularly 
valuable to small primary schools where working together allows economies of scale to be 
achieved’ (Department for Education, 2013). The most prevalent model of collaboration is 
the multi-academy trust (MAT) wherein all schools within the MAT are governed by one 
trust and board of directors. MATs perform a role similar to that which would otherwise be 
played by the LEA in that they hire/fire teachers and are responsible for negotiating every 
aspect of teacher contracts - the disciplinary process and redundancy pay amongst other 
things - with the exception of pensions. MATs can also substitute for local educational 
authorities (LEAs) in that they top-slice funds allocated to schools under their trust and use 
this to supply central services previously provided by the LEA. In 2016/17, about 80% of 
primary academies were in a multi-academy trust. In the sample studied here, there are 
slightly fewer schools in MATS, with around 70% operating under this organisational 
structure.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data 
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is a census of all pupils in the state system in England. 
NPD includes basic demographic details of pupils – such as ethnicity, free school meal 
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eligibility (FSM), gender, and whether or not English is their first language. The school 
attended by pupils can be linked to other school-level information such as the date of 
conversion to an academy school and the date and grade of Ofsted inspections (which are 
publicly available data). The data is longitudinal and tracks students as they progress through 
the state school system.  
 As discussed in Section 2, the national curriculum in England is organised around 
Key Stage’, the first two undertaken in primary school (in grades 1 to 6) and the second two 
in secondary school (in grades 7 to 11). Head teachers have a statutory duty to ensure that 
their teachers comply with all aspects of the Key Stage assessment and reporting 
arrangements. During primary school, this corresponds to Key Stage 1 and 2 which 
respectively cover grades 1-2 and 3-6. Local Authorities (and other recognised bodies) are 
responsible for moderation of schools. Thus, although teachers make their own assessments 
of students (and therefore could be susceptible to potential bias), there is a process in place to 
ensure that there is a meaningful assessment that is standardised over all of England. At the 
end of grade 2 in Key Stage 1, students are given a ‘level’ (i.e. there is no test score as such). 
However, following standard practice, National Curriculum levels achieved in Key Stage 1 
assessments are transformed into point scores using Department for Education point scales 
and these scores are used in the empirical work reported on below.
13
  
 At the end of primary school in grade 6 (or the end of the Key Stage 2 phase of 
education), pupils take national tests in reading and maths, which are externally set and 
marked on a scale of 1-100. The final dataset used in this paper contains of multiple cross 
sections of grade 6 pupils linked to their school, demographic information, and test scores for 
the academic year 2006/07 to 2014/15. Test scores – both baseline KS1 and the outcome KS2 
- are standardised, within the sample, at the grade/year/subject level.  
                                                          
13
 The point score can take on 7 values ranging from 3-27. The main results, given in Table 8, are unchanged 
when KS1 is removed as a control. 
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           Other data sources are utilised in parts of the empirical analysis. The School 
Workforce Census is school level data that is available from the 2010/11 school year and 
provides a snapshot of each maintained school’s workforce composition. Also studied is 
publicly available information on the income and expenditure of maintained schools and 
academies that is available from the 2009/10 school year. Finally, some results from a survey 
conducted by the Department for Education regarding the use of academy freedoms are 
presented (the source of these survey data is Cirin, 2014). This survey, which covers 25% of 
the 2919 academies that had opened by 1
st
 May 2013, and pertains to the freedoms exercised 
by schools once they gain academy status.  
Methodology 
The main research question of interest is to identify the effect of academy conversion 
on pupil achievement in the grade 6 national Key Stage 2 tests taken by pupils at the end of 
primary school. Administrative data that follows pupils through their school careers is used to 
estimate the impact of academy enrolment on Key Stage 2 performance. In order to study 
this, a research design where instrumental variables are combined with difference-in-
differences is implemented. In this design, outcomes of individuals in academies are 
compared with those who attend schools that later become academies, but do so after they sit 
their KS2 exams.  
For a given cohort of year 6 pupils who were legacy enrolled in academy conversions 
and control schools (future to be academies) a basic estimating equation is the following 
                                      
 
   
                 (1) 
 
In (1) i denotes pupil, s denotes the legacy enrolment school and t denotes school calendar 
year. Thus,     is a legacy enrolment school fixed effect
14
 and    is a time effect for the 
                                                          
14
 These are identified by inclusion of grade 6 students who sit exams in treatment schools prior to conversion.  
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academic year in which the pupil is in grade 6. The vector X is a set of control variables, and 
the binary         variable takes value 1 if pupil i who was legacy enrolled in school s sits 
their end of primary school KS2 examination in an academy school. Finally, v1 is an error 
term. 
Despite already restricting to the legacy enrolment sample so as to avoid endogeneity 
concerns it may still be problematic to estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares 
because legacy enrolled pupils may leave the school before the end of Key Stage 2. To allow 
for students to (potentially) sort into schools non-randomly as a result of the school obtaining 
academy status, an instrument for academy attendance is therefore used. This is whether or 
not the pupil was already enrolled in the school in the year prior to conversion in grades 2-5. 
Those for whom this variable takes a value of one are referred to as being intention-to-treat 
(ITT).  
Attention is focussed on those pre-enrolled in grades 2 to 5 as grade 5 is the 
penultimate year of primary education and grade 2 is when the KS1 assessment takes place, 
thus ensuring that KS1 assessment does not take place in an academy for the ITT pupils.
15
 It 
is important to note that pupils enrolling in the school after conversion are not included in the 
analysis. To ensure that the control group and treatment group are selected in the same way, a 
slightly different control group is used for each cohort of academy converters. For those 
converting in 2010/11 for example, the control group consists of pupils who are in grades 2-5 
in 2009/10 at schools that convert between 2011/12 and 2016/17, but are not expected to sit 
                                                          
15
 As schools typically enrol students 3 years prior to grade 2, we could estimate the effects for students pre-
enrolled in academies in earlier grades. In our case, we would be able to estimate the effect of one extra year for 
those in grade 1 in the first cohort of converters. However, doing so would either entail dropping KS1 scores 
from our estimates or assuming that KS1 performance is unaffected by academy attendance. Given that we do 
not gain many observations by adding extra pre-enrolled pupils we focus on those pre-enrolled in grade 2-5.  
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their exams in an academy.
16
 Control groups are defined similarly for all schools converting 
up to and including 2014/15.
17
  
Because of these restrictions, the event study on pupil performance has to be limited 
to a maximum of four years post-conversion, including the year of conversion itself. This is 
because there are 4 remaining years of primary school after the Key Stage 1 assessment. 
Thus, pupils affected by conversion in grade 2 of primary school (when KS1 assessments are 
taken) could have up to four post-conversion years of education in the academy. Similarly 
children affected by conversion when enrolled in the predecessor school in grade 3 could 
have up to three conversion years, and so on for children in grades 4 and 5 in the predecessor 
school.  
This setup permits implementation of a research design which estimates of the causal 
impact of being in an academy. For a given cohort of grade 6 treatment and control pupils 
this can be operationalised through the following estimation equations:  
                                    
 
   
                 (2) 
                                
 
   
                 (3) 
 
In the first stage, equation (2), estimates of θ2 show the proportion of the ITT group that stay 
in the academy and take their KS2 tests there. Equation (3) is the reduced form regression of 
KS2 on the instrument. A two stage least squares estimate (2SLS) estimate can then be 
obtained as the ratio of the reduced form coefficient to the first stage coefficient, θ3 /θ2. The 
main specifications that are estimated are equations (2) and (3) based on pooled data for the 
five cohorts of academy conversions already described.  
                                                          
16
 For example, in the case of the first cohort this necessitates removing those who, in 2009/10, are grades 2-4 in 
2011/12 converters, grades 2-3 in 2012/13 converters and grade 2 in 2013/14 converters.  
17
 The exact control group/treatment group structure is given in the appendix 
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Extending this to an event study framework enables separate estimates for the number 
of years a pupil is exposed to being in an academy post conversion (up to a maximum of four 
including conversion year) to be obtained. In this case, there are four instruments for whether 
a pupil is expected to sit their exams in the year of conversion (those in grade 5 in the year 
prior to conversion to instrument one year of exposure), the next year (those in grade 4 in the 
year prior to conversion to instrument two years of exposure) and so on up to the maximum 
of four years exposure (for those legacy enrolled in grade 2). It should be noted that, because 
of the data that we have, not all cohorts of converters contribute to the exposure estimates for 
later years. For instance, we can only identify the effect of four years exposure for those who 
are pre-enrolled in grade 2 in the first two cohorts of conversions.  
Comparison Schools 
A naive comparison between primary academies and all other state-maintained 
schools is likely to suffer from significant selection bias, since (as discussed above) 
conversion to an academy was done on a voluntary basis and better-performing schools were 
prioritised and actively encouraged to convert.
18
 One might expect schools seeking to become 
academies to have common unobservable characteristics such as having a school ethos more 
in line with the academy model. To account for this, pupils attending future converters are 
used as a control group in a difference-in-differences setting. Thus the data structure that is 
utilised is a balanced panel of schools for the school years 2006/07 to 2014/15 with repeated 
cross-sections of grade 6 pupils.  
Balancing Tests 
This approach can be legitimised first through covariate balancing tests between 
treatment and controls in the baseline academic year (2006/07). Second, and probably more 
importantly, the empirical analysis shows there to be no evidence of differential pre-
                                                          
18
 In other words, the instrument is only assumed to satisfy the exclusion restriction conditional on pupils being 
in a well-defined sub-sample of the population.  
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conversion trends in outcomes between pupils in treatment and control schools. On the 
former of these, Table 2 shows the extent to which treatment and control groups are balanced 
at baseline (2006/07) for the full sample of treatment and control schools, and separately for 
outstanding and non-outstanding schools. In terms of the full sample of all schools, there is a 
significant difference with respect to KS2 scores prior to the policy, with treatment schools 
being better performing in maths. The workforce in treatment schools also appears to be both 
larger and, on average, younger and there are more enrolled pupils in the treatment schools.  
 The above differences are not so surprising when it is acknowledged that the 
government prioritised better performing schools for conversion to academy status. For 
instance, within the sample of schools studied here, over 80% of the first cohort of 
conversions were deemed outstanding by Ofsted. This proportion declines monotonically to 
11% for the 2016/17 cohort of conversions.
19
 For this reason it is necessary to look within 
Ofsted grades (as defined by the latest Ofsted grade awarded prior to 2010/11) when 
comparing treatment and control schools. When this is done, the schools look much more 
balanced on observables.
20
 In fact, as Table 2 shows, within categories of outstanding and 
non-outstanding schools, there are few statistically significant differences at baseline between 
treatment and control schools. In fact, for outstanding schools there are no statistically 
significant differences (at the 5 percent level) for any baseline characteristics including KS2 
                                                          
19
 The exact proportions for the school years 2010/11 to 2016/17 are 83%, 43%, 20%, 17%, 14%, 14%,and 11%.  
20
 In addition to separately considering the relatively large number of pre-policy variables used here, we also 
adopted a different approach to create a single summary index and perform balancing tests on this. On example 
comes from regressing the pre-policy 2006/07 KS2 scores on English is first language, gender, ethnicity, free 
school meals status and Key Stage 1. This new index was balanced across treatment and control schools. For 
example in the case of the pooled sample, the treatment control difference (standard error) in the summary index 
was 0.025 (0.017), with a p-value of 0.14. The extent of balance was seen to be much better in outstanding 
schools where the treatment control difference (standard error) in the summary index was -0.003 (0.033), with a 
p-value of 0.92.  In non-outstanding schools the difference was 0.034 (0.019) with a p-value of 0.078. 
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and KS1 scores.
21
 Thus, regressions are estimated for schools within each Ofsted grade, as 
well as for the pooled sample.
22
 
 
4. Did Primary Academies Change Their Modes of Operation? 
Before looking at the effect of primary academies on pupil performance, evidence is 
presented on whether changes in the mode of operation occurred at primary schools that 
became academies prior to or during the 2014/15 academic year. Four aspects of this are 
considered. First, whether primary schools took up the option to exercise the many academy 
freedoms that became available from increased autonomy. Second, whether patterns of 
expenditure changed. Third, whether there were changes in workforce composition. Fourth, 
whether academies altered their pupil intake.  
Use of Academy Freedoms 
There have been various investigations into whether schools actually use their 
academy freedoms upon conversion (e.g. Academies Commission, 2013; Cirin, 2014). The 
existing descriptive evidence confirms that they mostly do, but with some degree of variation. 
The Academies Commission (2013) conclude that take-up of freedoms had been ‘piecemeal 
rather than comprehensive’, in part because changes can take time to implement and 
sometimes require consultation. Surveys of recent converters by Bassett et al. (2012) and 
Cirin (2014) found financial motives to be important in the decision to convert. In the former 
study, over 75% of respondents cited it as one of their reasons for converting and two-fifths 
as their primary reason. Cirin (2014) found that the desire ‘to gain greater freedom to use 
                                                          
21
 The closest to significance are school size (in terms of number of pupils) and number of teachers. The next 
section reports results on whether these changed significantly on becoming an academy, revealing there to be no 
significant changes. 
22
 While there are four possible grades awarded by Ofsted, two groups are considered, outstanding and non-
outstanding, the latter comprising good, satisfactory and unsatisfactory. The direct focus on the outstanding 
group is because they were the ones that were earmarked for the fast track to become an academy. The non-
outstanding group are also amalgamated on account of the relatively small number of satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory schools in the sample. When estimating the pooled regressions over all schools, all variables are 
interacted with Ofsted grade. 
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funding as you see fit’ was the most commonly cited reason for conversion (cited by 83% of 
respondents). The vast majority (almost 9 in 10) also moved to procure services themselves. 
Importantly, Cirin (2014) breaks down results by primary and secondary status. This 
shows that the majority of academies do exercise freedoms, but this is more common in 
secondary than in primary schools. This is shown in Table 3, taken from his survey of 720 
academies which were open on 1 May 2013. The numbers in the Table show most schools 
report a use of academy freedoms, but that the percentage of primary schools making a 
particular change is smaller than it is for secondary schools. Furthermore, Cirin (2014) 
reports that almost all schools surveyed made at least one change (702 out of 720), implying 
that at least 95% of primary converters (262 primary converters were surveyed) exercised at 
least one freedom, with two-thirds believing that the changes improved attainment. 
Changes in Expenditure Patterns 
 Studies cited above on the use of academy freedoms suggest that the financial motive 
to convert was important. Table 4 shows numbers on income and expenditure before and 
after conversion in treatment and control schools using administrative data on school income 
and expenditure. Changes between the 2009/10 and the 2014/15 school years are reported. 
There are some data issues that need to be highlighted upfront before discussing these 
numbers. First, the timing of reporting changed after conversion, with academies reporting in 
the September-August school year as opposed to the April-March financial year.
23
 The latter 
is in line with local authority financial statements and was the practice in schools before they 
converted to become an academy and in control schools throughout the period of the analysis. 
Secondly, accounts for schools that do not convert in the period (the control schools) do not 
include the value of LEA provided services; however, information is available on how much 
extra income is given to academies to cover the value of these services (the Education 
                                                          
23
 For a small number of schools (35), the accounts cover a period exceeding 12 months. In these cases, it is   
known how long the accounts cover and numbers for them are weighted accordingly (i.e. proportionately scaling 
down all items by the fraction 12/period covered).  
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Services Grant - ESG). To make the numbers comparable this is removed from both the grant 
income and expenditure for academies in column (2) of Table 4.  
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 show that per pupil income and expenditure was 
similar for the treatment and control schools before conversion. For example, as shown in 
Panel A, total income in all treatment and control schools was £3,974 and £4,156 per pupil 
respectively. Total expenditure was £3,966 and £4,154 per pupil in treatment and control 
schools respectively. As shown in Panels B to C of the Table, these pre-conversion numbers 
are also closely aligned for the comparisons undertaken within the outstanding and non-
outstanding groups of schools. 
 It is evident, however, that converting primary schools both received more money and 
spent more money post-conversion, even once the extra money given for LEA provided 
services is accounted for. The Table also shows the income and expenditure per pupil after 
conversion and a difference-in-difference estimate in the final column. This shows significant 
income and expenditure gaps arising after conversion relative to what happened in the control 
schools. The differences in total income and expenditure are estimated as £296 and £522 per 
pupil per year. The increases are clearly driven by the relative increase in grant income. A 
similar qualitative pattern is shown for schools classified as outstanding and non-outstanding, 
but with higher income and expenditure shown for the latter schools, most likely reflecting a 
higher proportion of disadvantaged students in this group. 
 Table 5 shows the change in categories of expenditure per pupil before and after 
conversion.
24
 There are three Panels, which differ according to assumptions made about 
which services the academies procure post-conversion given that they are no longer provided 
for them by the local authority. The numbers in the upper Panel A are changes inclusive of 
the extra money delegated to them. The numbers in the middle Panel B subtract an equal 
                                                          
24
 The detailed expenditure categories that have been aggregated to the four categories in Table 5 are reported in 
Appendix Table A1. 
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share of the ESG money from each category of expenditure. Finally, those in the lower Panel 
C remove all of the extra ESG money from the expenditure on non-staff related running 
costs.  
In each case it is very clear that, even though primary academies spent more on 
teaching staff, non-teaching staff, and other running costs after conversion (relative to control 
schools), the increase was greater for administrative costs (i.e. non-teaching staff and other 
running costs). This is true for schools in all Ofsted categories. Because the amount of money 
earmarked for services previously provided by LEAs from expenditure is removed, these 
shifts cannot be attributed solely to the mechanical shift caused by the school having to take 
on more administrative tasks post-conversion. It seems that the primary academies studied in 
this paper did receive more income, but that they spent it disproportionately on day-to-day 
running operations rather than on ‘frontline services’ such as teaching staff. 
Changes in Workforce 
 Table 6 reports evidence on changes in the composition of the school workforce 
between 2010/11 and 2014/15 for schools that became academies in that period relative to 
schools that became academies in 2015/16 and 2016/17. Changes are shown for all schools 
and stratified by Ofsted rating. The Table reports difference-in-differences estimates for the 
total number of teachers employed, the pupil/teacher ratio, the mean teacher salary, the 
proportion of teachers who are in the leadership group or whether the school changes its head 
teacher.  
In general, the results reported in the Table show little evidence of workforce changes 
resulting from academisation. The one exception is head teacher turnover. For the full 
sample, there is a statistically significant 6.3 percentage point reduction in head teacher 
turnover in primaries that became academies. When broken down by Ofsted category, this 
occurs only in non-outstanding schools, which are 7.2 percentage points less likely to take on 
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a new head teacher. This stands in direct contrast to the finding of Eyles and Machin (2015) 
who found that the vast majority of the first phase of academy conversions in the 2000s were 
characterised by new head teachers coming into academies and therefore that changes in 
managerial structure were a key feature of academy conversion that facilitated increased 
autonomy. This mechanism appears to be completely absent in the case of primary schools. 
Changes in Intake 
Alongside performance effects we look at whether pupil composition changed once a 
school gained academy status. As data is available prior to 2010/11, the analysis considers 
year-on-year changes between 2007/08 and 2014/15 in the characteristics of those entering 
the earliest grade in which the schools enrol pupils. We also include observations of pupils 
over this period that enter schools which become academies after the sample ends (in 2015/16 
and 2016/17).  The three outcomes considered are the fraction of the pupil intake who are 
eligible for free school meals, the fraction with English as a native language, and the total 
size of the entry year intake (in logs).  In each case, school and year effects are included. The 
results, presented in Table 7, show no evidence that schools alter their intake along these 
dimensions.
25
  
Summary 
 Taken together, the findings show that primary schools changed some aspects of their 
operations after becoming academies. In particular, most primary academies began to use 
freedoms made available to them as a consequence of conversion. They also received more 
income and altered how their expenditure was allocated across functions. With regard to the 
latter, the observed spending changes mainly affected administrative functioning and day-to-
day operations, because of the removal of such provision from the local authority. At the 
                                                          
25
 This contrasts with the findings on the first batch of secondary school academies reported in Eyles and 
Machin (2015), where intake changed significantly.   
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same time, there was not much change in the school personnel or in composition of the pupil 
intake.  
 
5. Pupil Performance Results 
This section reports the results on pupil performance, starting with the main baseline set of 
results showing the causal impact of academy conversion on pupil performance. Then, in the 
light of the previous section’s results showing that most, but not all, primary schools altered 
their modes of operation post-conversion, heterogeneous estimates along a number of 
dimensions are reported.  
Main Results 
Table 8 shows estimates of the 2SLS specifications studying the impact of 
academisation on pupil performance in reading and maths in tests at the end of primary 
school. Separate coefficients are shown for each subject, both for the pooled sample and by 
whether the predecessor school’s Ofsted grade was outstanding or not. Columns (1) to (3) 
show estimates when the treatment is whether the school converts to academy status. 
Columns (4) to (6) show estimates for years of exposure.  
As the vast majority of legacy enrolled pupils stay in the school to take their KS2 
exams - first stage estimates range from 0.92 to 0.95 - only 2SLS estimates are presented. In 
all cases, there is no evidence of any performance boost from academisation. The estimates 
are small in magnitude, sometimes negative, and almost all statistically insignificant. In terms 
of magnitude, the largest positive estimate is 0.02σ (with standard error 0.03) for reading in 
outstanding schools as reported in specification (2) of the Table. All of the other 2SLS 
estimates are lower than this, and nine of the twelve maths and reading estimates (including 
all six for maths) have negative signs. When considering the average of reading and maths 
scores it seems that primary age pupils did not benefit from attending an academy school in 
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terms of their performance at the end of primary school.
 26
  As results prove similar whether 
reading or math marks are used as the outcome of interest, only results based on average 
points are shown for the rest of the paper.
27
  
 One might be concerned about the research design being potentially contaminated by 
differential pre-policy trends.
28
  Figure 2 therefore shows estimates from an event study, for 
the pooled sample, for pupils attending academies four years prior to academy conversion to 
three years after. The effects of being in an academy remain numerically small and 
insignificant (as the c to c+3 coefficients all overlap with the zero line on the Figure). 
Moreover, there is no sign of pre-policy trends, nor any gradual improvement in results post-
conversion.  
 Table 9 also further generalises the Table 8 baseline results by reporting estimates for 
legacy enrolled pupils by discrete years of exposure, ranging from one to a maximum of four. 
Again, there is neither any sign of a positive effect nor any suggestion that benefits might be 
increasing with years of exposure. If anything, the opposite is the case, as the absolute values 
of the negative coefficients mostly get larger with more years of exposure. 
Heterogeneity 
While there is no evidence of performance effects on average, nor in the event study 
and years of exposure analysis, it may still be the case that academisation has scope to benefit 
some subsets of students and not others. It is also possible that certain school characteristics 
may be associated with differential academy effects on pupil performance.   
Table 10 therefore shows results from investigation of whether the estimated 2SLS 
effect size differs in several ways: i) with whether the pupil is eligible for free school meals 
                                                          
26
 We also looked at mobility between grades 2 and 6 and how it differs between treatment and control schools. 
Using pupil mobility as an outcome variable revealed there to be no differential transfer between the two sets of 
schools. Running this on all schools, and within the Ofsted groupings, detected no significant differences. 
27
 Results for Tables 8 to 10 for maths and reading considered separately are available in the appendix.  
28
 A second concern flagged by referees was the potential for spillovers between treated and control schools. To 
deal with this we re-estimated our main regressions, but removed control schools that were within 3km of any 
treated school. Our results were unaffected by this change.  
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or not; ii) with an indicator for whether the school is in an urban area or not (given that the 
charter school literature finds positive effects to be concentrated amongst urban schools); iii) 
whether it differs with pre-conversion school size (as larger schools may be more adept at 
managing their extra freedoms); and iv) whether the school joins a multi-academy trust 
(MAT).  
The results reported in the Table do little to alter the prior analysis. First, there is little 
evidence that the effect of academy attendance differs depending on whether one is eligible 
for free school meals or attends an urban academy. Panel C of Table 10, shows that the same 
can be said for pupils attending schools of differing sizes. Although performance effects 
appear to decline with school size, none of these interactions reach statistical significance.  
The final aspect of heterogeneity considered – whether or not pupils attend an 
academy that becomes part of a (MAT) or not – does uncover some differences. The most 
noteworthy is that some of the estimates for not being in a MAT are significantly negative. 
This is the case for all schools where there is a 0.06σ (0.02) fall – closer investigation shows 
that this is confined to the non-outstanding schools. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
conversion in stand-alone (non-MAT) schools, which are not able to benefit from the 
economies of scale that a MAT can bring, may have actually proven detrimental to pupils 
enrolled in previously non-outstanding academies. However, this result should be taken with 
caution. About 60% of the primary academies considered here are part of a MAT, but it 
should be acknowledged that whether or not a school is able to join a trust is endogenous to 
KS2 performance; results showing performance drops could be due to negative selection to 
the category of non-MAT academy schools (evident only for non-outstanding schools). 
 
6. Conclusion 
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The English government has radically restructured its school system under an assumption that 
academisation delivers benefits to schools and students. This paper reports results from 
investigations studying the unexpected policy change that occurred in 2010 that enabled (and 
encouraged) primary schools to become academies. It looks at the first primary schools that 
have become academies in England (between 2010/11 and 2014/15) and finds no evidence of 
pupil performance improvement resulting from conversion.  
 How should an overall zero effect be interpreted in the light of some evidence 
showing positive effects of autonomy in other contexts? One reason is that schools that 
converted were already doing well within the system and simply did not require additional 
autonomy in order to thrive and therefore did not make substantive changes. Indeed the 
limited changes that are seen – increasing expenditure on non-instructional tasks – do not 
correspond to the kinds of changes, such as effective discipline and higher quality teaching 
that have been found to increase test scores in other contexts such as charter schools (Fryer, 
2014).   
In existing research, much of the positive effects of autonomous schools have been 
shown for disadvantaged students and not so much for advantaged students. While there was 
scope to improve achievement within these schools, it may be that changes introduced as a 
result of school autonomy simply do not benefit such students at the margin. However, given 
the survey evidence reported above and the research into how additional income was used by 
schools, it would appear that many of these schools did not make changes that affect 
‘frontline services’ (as opposed to administrative roles).  
Another possible reason is that effects are estimated in the short run. It may be that 
the programme will bear fruit once more schools convert and facilitate greater economies of 
scale by entering into or deepening collaborative arrangements with each other. In the 
heterogeneity analysis, we found some evidence of variation by whether or not schools are in 
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a multi-academy trust. Although we do not take the effect to be causal due to the endogenous 
decision to join a MAT, it is still a worrying finding that performance dips for the non-
outstanding primary schools (around 40 percent of converters) that do not join a multi-
academy trust.  
Finally, one of the key models for some successful urban charters in the US and some 
secondary schools in England
29
 – an effective discipline approach for academies and the No 
Excuses model of charters – is of less relevance to the age range of children enrolled in 
English primary schools than for secondary age children (since behavioural problems that 
may lead pupils to be suspended or excluded from school are much more prevalent in the 
latter).
30
 In the light of all these factors, it is not surprising that there has been no overall 
effect on pupil performance.  
 One might argue that if academisation has no average effect on pupil performance, 
this could still be a reasonable public policy if there are other reasons for why this might be 
beneficial – for example, if school leaders can more easily make changes that might benefit 
students (or their parents) and staff. However, the process of restructuring individual schools 
has been shown to be financially costly and restructuring on a system wide basis would likely 
prove to be too costly in the long run if it fails to generate gains for students in terms of test 
scores. Furthermore, risks are also posed by an increasing number of schools becoming 
academies.
31
 For example, they are no longer regularly monitored at the local level. Problems 
might not therefore come to light unless they are flagged up by an Ofsted inspection, which 
are not regular events. There are potential negative spill-overs on other schools if opting out 
                                                          
29
 A well-known, and highly publicised, example of the latter is Hackney's Haggerston School in London which 
is a secondary school has fully utilised an effective discipline and good behaviour approach in its successful rise 
up the KS4 achievement distribution, despite having a relatively disadvantaged pupil intake. 
30
 For instance, exclusions and fixed term suspensions are extremely rare in the age range that we study. In 
English schools, 3.88% of pupils received a fixed period exclusion in 2014/15, and 0.07% were permanently 
excluded. For primary schools the numbers were much lower - 1.1% of pupils received a fixed term exclusion 
and 0.02% were permanently excluded in the school year 2014/15 (Department for Education, 2016). 
31
 See Ladd and Fiske (2016). 
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of Local Authority control undermines services that the Local Authority is able to provide to 
other schools in the same geographic area (e.g. child psychologists to support children with 
special needs in many schools). Studying the operational aspects of academies, and the 
institutional structures in which they function, is an important subject for future research. 
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Figure 1: Number of Primary School Academies in England 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The Figure shows the number of primary/ middle deemed primary schools open in 
each school year as academies, and/or free schools. Source data Edubase, available at 
http://www.education.gov.uk/edubase/home.xhtml 
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Figure 2:  Event Study Estimates, Pre- and Post-Academy Conversion 
 
 
Notes: c refers to academy conversion year. KS2 performance is measured by standardised average point score. 
The coefficients come from the same 2SLS estimates as reported in column (1) of Table 8, but with dummies 
for the number of years before or after conversion the exam is sat in an academy. The four post conversion 
dummies (c to c+3) are instrumented for with four ITT/ITT grade interactions. A joint test for the significant of 
the pre-conversion dummies gives a chi square statistic of 0.71 (p-value = 0.59).  
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Figure 3:  Event Study Estimates by (Pre-Intervention) Ofsted Grade 
 
 
Notes: c refers to academy conversion year. KS2 performance is measured by the standardised average point 
score. The coefficients come from the same 2SLS estimates as reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 8, but 
with dummies for the number of years before or after conversion the exam is sat in an academy. The four post 
conversion dummies (c to c+3) are instrumented for with four ITT/ITT grade interactions. A joint test for the 
significant of the pre-conversion dummies gives a chi square statistic of 1.26 (p-value = 0.28) in the case of 
outstanding schools and 0.79 (p-value = 0.60) in the case of non-outstanding. 
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Table 1: Number of New Primary Converter Academies in the Study Sample 
 
 
Notes: In order to implement the research design, only schools in the sample that have students in grades 2 and grades 6 in each academic year between 2006/07 and 2014/15 
are included. The main discrepancy between the numbers in this Table and the total number of primary academies given in Figure 1 arise because of: a) the removal of infant 
and junior schools (the latter do not to enrol children in grade 2, while the former do not do so in grade 6) and b) because Figure 1 also includes sponsored academies 
(comprising around 30 percent of primary academies) and a small number of free schools (139 by 2016/17), which are not studied in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic Year 
 
 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
 
     
  
Pooled 12 174 252 234 243 210 309 
Outstanding 10 74 51 40 35 30 35 
Non-Outstanding 2 100 201 194 208 180 274 
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics: Pooled Sample and by Ofsted Grade 
 
 
Notes: All variables are measured in the school year 2006/07. All KS1 and KS2 scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of 1 (within the year and 
overall sample). Ofsted grades are measured prior to the policy. Since Ofsted inspect schools every 3-5 years (see Section 3), the grades here are the most recent grade 
between 2006/07 and 2009/10 (i.e. prior to the policy change). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
All Schools 
 
Outstanding Schools 
 
Non-Outstanding Schools 
          
          
 Treatment Control Treatment – 
Control 
p-value 
 
Treatment Control Treatment – 
Control 
p-value 
 
Treatment Control Treatment – 
Control 
p-value 
 
          
English is first language 0.924 0.926 0.858 0.908 0.911 0.808 0.929 0.929 0.964 
White British 0.877 0.881 0.609 0.855 0.854 0.989 0.883 0.886 0.543 
Eligible to receive free school meals 0.126 0.133 0.336 0.108 0.109 0.889 0.131 0.138 0.309 
Male 0.512 0.509 0.073 0.509 0.506 0.279 0.512 0.509 0.141 
KS2 reading 0.049 0.003 0.418 0.298 0.280 0.647 -0.025 -0.048 0.496 
KS2 maths 0.060 -0.010 0.032 0.334 0.296 0.300 -0.021 -0.066 0.060 
KS1 reading 0.030 0.003 0.721 0.186 0.173 0.732 -0.016 -0.028 0.817 
KS1 maths 0.024 -0.002 0.727 0.172 0.163 0.826 -0.02 -0.032 0.777 
Number of teachers 14.958 14.294 0.020 16.443 15.419 0.087 14.516 14.09 0.093 
Proportion unqualified teachers 0.033 0.030 0.484 0.039 0.036 0.587 0.031 0.029 0.624 
Number of pupils 278.709 264.890 0.018 313.448 289.825 0.052 268.362 260.357 0.109 
Pupil teacher ratio 18.555 18.322 0.231 19.179 18.843 0.402 18.369 18.228 0.372 
Mean teacher age 41.077 41.483 0.034 40.276 40.413 0.630 41.322 41.683 0.032 
Mean teacher salary 32412 32545 0.034 32568 32545 0.863 32364 32545 0.046 
          
Number of schools                     1434                     275                    1159 
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Table 3: Percentage Using Freedoms Since Becoming an Academy: Primary and Secondary Schools 
 
  
Secondary Schools 
 
Primary Schools 
 
   
Changed your pattern of capital expenditure 63 54 
Introduced savings in back-office functions 62 54 
Changed the performance management system for teachers 63 49 
Changed the curriculum you offer 60 49 
Changed school leadership 51 43 
Introduced or increased revenue-generating activities 41 28 
Hired teachers without qualified teacher status (ATS) 23 8 
Sought to attach pupils from a different geographical area 14 5 
Increased the length of the school day 10 5 
Changed the length of school terms 6 2 
 
Number of schools 360 334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cirin (2014). Online survey of 720 academies that were open on 1 May 2013. 
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Table 4: Changes in School Income per Pupil and Expenditure per Pupil Before and After Academy Conversion 
 
 Treatment Schools Control Schools Treatment – Control 
 Before After Change Before After Change Difference-in-Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) = (2) – (1) (4) (5) (6) = (5) – (4) (7) = (3) – (6) 
        
A. All Schools        
(843 Treatment, 466 Control)        
Total income 3974 4997 1023 (26) 4156 4883 727 (41) 296 (48) 
Grant income 3810 4771 961 (24) 4019 4704 685 (40) 276 (47) 
Other income 164 226 63 (10) 137 179 42   (7)   20 (12) 
Total expenditure 3966 5121 1155 (33) 4154 4788 633 (43) 522 (54) 
        
B. Outstanding 
(200 Treatment, 59 Control) 
       
Total income 3755 4807 1052 (47) 3851 4819 967 (199) 85 (203) 
Grant income 3580 4559 979 (43) 3706 4598 892 (199) 88 (202) 
Other income 175 248 73 (23) 145 221 76 (27) -2   (35) 
Total expenditure 3754 4890 1135 (59) 3834 4754 920 (201) 215 (208) 
        
C. Non-Outstanding        
(643 Treatment, 407 Control)        
Total income 4042 5056 1014 (30) 4200 4892 692 (37) 322 (48) 
Grant income 3882 4837 955 (29) 4064 4719 655 (36) 300 (46) 
Other income 160 220 59 (11) 136 173 37  ( 6)   22 (13) 
Total expenditure 4032 5193 1161 (39) 4201 4792 592 (39) 569 (55) 
        
 
 
 
 
Notes: The sources for expenditure data are publicly available consistent financial reporting records for all state-maintained schools and academies financial benchmarking data for 
academy schools. The former are available at https://www.compare-school-performance.service.gov.uk/ and the latter can be accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-local-authority-school-finance-data. For academies opening in April to August of the school year, incomes and expenditures in 
the first full year of conversion are appropriately scaled. In columns (3), (6) and (7), long changes are considered between 2009/10 (Before) and 2014/15 (After). Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5: Changes in Expenditure Category per Pupil Before and After Academy Conversion 
 
 
 All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding 
 Pre-Change 
Mean 
Difference-in-
Difference 
Pre-Change 
Mean 
Difference-in-
Difference 
Pre-Change 
Mean 
Difference-in-
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  
       
A. Includes ESG       
Total teaching staff 2063 58 (27) 1969 -43 (104) 2086 65 (27) 
Total non-teaching staff 1236 168 (24) 1113 10   (66) 1266 197 (26) 
Learning and ICT resources 212 -8   (8) 216 -3   (22) 211 -10   (9) 
Other running costs 523 305 (22) 475 251 (47) 535 318 (25) 
       
B. ESG Equally Deducted       
Total teaching staff 2063 32 (27) 1969 -75 (104) 2086 40 (27) 
Total non-teaching staff 1236 148 (24) 1113 -12  (66) 1266 178 (26) 
Learning and ICT resources 212 -12   (8) 216 -8  (22) 211 -13   (9) 
Other running costs 523 294 (22) 475 239 (47) 535 308 (25) 
       
C. ESG Deducted From Other Running Costs       
Total teaching staff 2063 58 (27) 1969 -43 (104) 2086 65 (27) 
Total non-teaching staff 1236 168 (24) 1113 10  (66) 1266 197 (26) 
Learning and ICT resources 212 -8   (8) 216 -3  (22) 211 -10   (9) 
Other running costs 523 245 (22) 475 181 (49) 535 262 (26) 
       
Number of treatment schools 
Number of control schools 
843 
466 
 
 
200 
59 
 
643 
407 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: As for Table 4. The top panel includes extra money given to academies to cover services previously provided by the LEA. The middle panel removes this 
expenditure equally from each expenditure category. The bottom panel removes all the extra money from the other running costs category. 
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Table 6: Changes in Workforce, School-Level Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
 
 All Schools Outstanding  Non-Outstanding  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log(Number of teachers) 0.007 (0.012) 0.015 (0.025) 0.007 (0.014) 
Log(Pupil teacher ratio) -0.018 (0.011) -0.007 (0.023) -0.016 (0.012) 
Log(Mean teacher salary) -0.003 (0.007) 0.001 (0.013) -0.006 (0.008) 
Proportion of teachers in leadership group 0.003 (0.005) 0.005 (0.010) 0.003 (0.005) 
Change in head teacher -0.063 (0.028) -0.002 (0.070) -0.072 (0.031) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Based on data from the schools’ workforce census for the academic years 2010/11 and 2014/15. All variables are long changes between these two academic 
years. The subsample is the sample of schools who are observed in each of the two years. We exclude schools converting in 2010/11 as we do not observe a pre-
treatment observation. Robust standard errors in parentheses are reported in each case. The sample sizes for the first three rows (Number of teachers; Pupil teacher 
ratio; proportion of teachers in leadership group) are 1326, 254, 1072 for all schools, outstanding schools, and non-outstanding schools respectively. For the head 
teacher regression the sample sizes are 1327, 257 and 1070 for all schools, outstanding schools, and non-outstanding schools respectively. Baseline means are: 
15.321 teachers; 21.565 pupils per teacher; £36446 average salary; 0.173 of teachers are in the leadership group 0.445 of schools change head teacher over the 
course of the five years. 
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Table 7: Changes in Pupil Intake 
 All Schools Outstanding Not-Outstanding 
 FSM English 
Language 
Log (No of 
Pupils) 
FSM English 
Language 
Log (No of 
Pupils) 
FSM English 
Language 
Log (No of 
Pupils) 
          
Academy 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.011 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.019) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007) 
          
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Sample size 467386 466635 12906 102565 102459 2475 364821 364176 10431 
Number of schools 1434 1434 1434 275 275 275 1159 1159 1159 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Variables refer to the pupils entering the lowest grade in the school in each year. Each cell is a coefficient estimated from a separate regression. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at school level 
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Table 8: The Effect of Treatment on KS2 Test Scores (measured at age 11) 
 2SLS (Incidence) 2SLS (Years of Exposure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Outstanding Non-Outstanding Pooled Outstanding Non- Outstanding 
       
Maths -0.021 -0.002 -0.027 -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
Reading 0.001 0.020 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.026) (0.014) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) 
Average Point Score -0.013 0.008 -0.021 -0.010 -0.001 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
       
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample size 1636948 296675 1340273 1636948 296675 1340273 
Number of  schools 1434 275 1159 1434 275 1159 
       
First stage 0.937  
(0.002) 
0.950 
 (0.002) 
0.932 
 (0.002) 
0.928  
(0.002) 
0.942  
(0.003) 
0.922  
(0.003) 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Each cell is a coefficient estimated from a separate regression. Full controls are included (for gender, ethnicity, speaks English as first language, eligible for free schools meals, prior 
attainment (Key Stage 1). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level. 
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Table 9: Effects by Year of Exposure 
 All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding 
 Average Point Score Average Point Score Average Point Score 
       
One year of exposure 0.001 (0.012) 0.011 (0.024) -0.001 (0.014) 
Two years of exposure -0.015 (0.016) 0.030 (0.030) -0.030 (0.019) 
Three years of exposure -0.042 (0.022) -0.024 (0.045) -0.049 (0.025) 
Four years of exposure -0.042 (0.033) -0.020 (0.060) -0.053 (0.039) 
       
School fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
       
Sample size 1636948 296675 1340273 
Number of schools 1434 275 1159 
    
First stage coefficient on IIT x one year of exposure 0.963 (0.001) 0.974 (0.002) 0.960 (0.002) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x two years of exposure 0.931 (0.002) 0.946 (0.003) 0.926 (0.003) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x three years of exposure 0.902 (0.004) 0.927 (0.005) 0.891 (0.005) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x four years of exposure 0.869 (0.007) 0.889 (0.008) 0.857 (0.011) 
 
 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates reported. Full controls are included (for gender, ethnicity, speaks English as first language, eligible for free schools meals, prior attainment, 
primary school). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level. 
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Table 10: Heterogeneity 
 All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding 
 Average Point Score Average Point Score Average Point Score 
       
A. Free school meal eligibility       
Yes 0.008 (0.021) 0.025 (0.045) 0.004 (0.024) 
No -0.017 (0.014) 0.006 (0.029) -0.025 (0.015) 
       
B. Urban       
Yes -0.012 (0.015) 0.019 (0.031) -0.023 (0.018) 
No -0.021 (0.019) -0.037 (0.038) -0.013 (0.021) 
       
C. Baseline school size 
      
Treatment 0.108 (0.103) 0.278 (0.166) 0.065 (0.128) 
Treatment*Baseline school size -0.021 (0.018) -0.046 (0.029) -0.015 (0.023) 
       
D. Multi academy trust       
Yes 0.030 (0.016) 0.032 (0.033) 0.031 (0.019) 
No -0.057 (0.017) -0.013 (0.034) -0.075 (0.020) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates comparable to columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 8, but with mutually exclusive interactions included for panels A, B, 
and to D. Panel C reports estimates that interact treatment status with baseline (2006/07) school size in logs. In terms of free school meal 
status, 14% of pupils in the treated schools are eligible, 12% of pupils in outstanding treated schools are eligible, and 15% of pupils in non-
outstanding treated. For all treated schools in the sample 71% are in urban areas and 57% are in multi-academy trusts. The same numbers for 
outstanding and non-outstanding schools are: urban 72%/71%; multi-academy trusts 50%/59% respectively.   
. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix contains information on the way in which the sample of pupils and schools 
were selected for the analysis of primary academies, issues related to the school income and 
expenditure data analysed in the paper, and provides the main estimates in Tables 9-10 of the 
paper by subject.  
 
1). Sample Accounting Structure 
 
Here we describe the structure of the Intention to Treat (ITT) groups in each wave of 
academy conversions that are studied. Because we combine difference in differences with 
instrumental variables, we use a different group of control schools for each cohort of 
academy conversion. Below we detail the treatment and control samples for each of the five 
treated cohorts of academy conversions.  
 
For the first cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in grades 2-5 in 2009/10 
in 2010/11 converters. Alongside this we have pupils in grade 6 in 2010/11 converters in the 
years 2006/07 to 2009/10. As controls we include the following: those in grade 6 in the years 
2006/07 to 2009/10 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert to academies 
between 2011/12 and 2016/17; those in grades 2-5 in 2009/10 in 2016/17 converters; those in 
grades 2-5 in 2009/10 in 2015/16 converters; those in grades 2-5 in 2009/10 in 2014/15 
converters; those in grades 3-5 in 2009/10 in 2013/14 converters; those in grades 4-5 in 
2009/10 in 2012/13 converters; those in grade 5 in 2009/10 in 2011/12 converters. 
 
For the second cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in grades 2-5 in 
2010/11 in 2011/12 converters. Alongside this we have pupils in grade 6 in 2011/12 
converters in the years 2006/07 to 2010/11. As controls we include the following: those in 
grade 6 in the years 2006/07 to 2010/11 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert 
to academies between 2012/13 and 2016/17; those in grades 2-5 in 2010/11 in 2016/17 
converters; those in grades 2-5 in 2010/11 in 2015/16 converters; those in grades 3-5 in 
2010/11 in 2014/15 converters; those in grades 4-5 in 2010/11 in 2013/14 converters; those in 
grade 5 in 2010/11 in 2012/13. 
 
For the third cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in grades 3-5 in 2011/12 
in 2012/13 converters. Alongside this we have pupils in grade 6 in 2012/13 converters in the 
years 2006/07 to 2011/12. As controls we include the following: those in grade 6 in the years 
2006/07 to 2011/12 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert to academies 
between 2013/14 and 2016/17; those in grades 3-5 in 2011/12 in 2016/17 converters; those in 
grades 3-5 in 2011/12 in 2015/16 converters; those in grades 4-5 in 2011/12 in 2014/15 
converters; those in grade 5 in 2011/12 in 2013/14. 
 
For the fourth cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in grades 4-5 in 
2012/13 in 2013/14 converters. Alongside this we have pupils in grade 6 in 2013/14 
converters in the years 2006/07 to 2012/13. As controls we include the following: those in 
grade 6 in the years 2006/07 to 2012/13 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert 
to academies between 2014/15 and 2016/17; those in grades 4-5 in 2012/13 in 2016/17 
converters; those in grades 4-5 in 2012/13 in 2015/16 converters; those in grade 5 in 2012/13 
in 2014/15 converters. 
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For the fifth and final cohort of conversions, the ITT sample consists of those in grades 5 in 
2013/14 in 2014/15 converters. Alongside this we have pupils in grade 6 in 2014/15 
converters in the years 2006/07 to 2013/14. As controls we include the following: those in 
grade 6 in the years 2006/07 to 2013/14 who sit their exams in schools that go on to convert 
to academies between 2015/16 and 2016/17; those in grades 5 in 2013/14 in 2016/17 
converters; those in grades 5 in 2013/14 in 2015/16 converters. 
 
2). Income and Expenditure Data Sources 
 
The income and expenditure data come from two sources; first, data on income and 
expenditure for academy schools is from the publicly available (at the Department for 
Education website
32
) benchmark accounts returns, required by the Department for Education, 
for all academy schools; second, data for maintained schools comes from consistent financial 
reports, which are also made publicly available, as part of the school performance tables.
33
 
34
 
 
While maintained schools and academies are both required to submit financial returns, so as 
to allow the public to benchmark schools spending against each other, the data collected is 
slightly different for academies and state schools. In particular, state schools file a return for 
the standard financial year (April to March) while academies file a return covering the 
academic year (September to August). Exemptions are also available for academies in terms 
of both the length of the return and whether or not a return must be filed. When schools 
convert between March and August of a given year they have the option to file a return that 
exceeds 12 months (but is less than 18 months). In the very small number of cases where this 
is done the data are weighted to be made comparable with a 12 month return (i.e. 
proportionally weighting by 12 divided by the number of months for which the return is 
filed).  
 
Table A1 shows a breakdown of the expenditures that are in each category.
35
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
32
 See <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-and-expenditure-in-academies-in-england-2014-to-
2015> for 2014/15 data. 
33
 <https://www.compare-school-performance.service.gov.uk/> 
34
 While the data are publicly available some variables are suppressed; for instance, teaching staff costs are 
suppressed for small schools for confidentiality reasons (it is also necessary to suppress other costs at random so 
as to make it impossible to impute teaching costs from total expenditure). We would like to thank Andrew 
Mellon and Robert Drake at the Department for Education for providing us with unsuppressed data for both 
academies and maintained schools. 
35
 A detailed discussion of these categories is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/423098/CFR_guidance_FINAL_
150415.pdf 
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Table A1: Expenditure Categories 
 
Total Teaching Staff Total Non-Teaching Staff Learning and ICT 
Resources 
Other Running Costs 
 
Teaching Staff 
Supply teaching staff 
Supply teacher insurance 
Agency supply teaching staff 
(minus) Receipts from supply 
teacher insurance claims 
Education support staff 
 
Cost of other staff 
Indirect employee 
expenses 
Development and 
training 
Staff related insurance 
Administrative and 
clerical staff 
Administrative supply 
Bought in professional 
services such as auditor 
costs 
 
Learning resources (not 
ICT equipment) 
ICT learning resources 
 
Premises staff 
Building maintenance and improvement 
Grounds maintenance and improvement 
Cleaning and caretaking 
Water and sewerage 
Other occupation costs 
Catering staff 
Catering supplies 
(minus) Income from catering 
Energy 
Bought in professional services – 
curriculum 
Rates 
Exam fees 
Other insurance premiums 
Special facilities 
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Table A2: Effects by Year of Exposure, by Subject 
 
 All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding 
 Maths Reading Maths Reading Maths Reading 
       
One year of exposure -0.005 0.012 0.001 0.021 -0.007 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) 
Two years of exposure -0.027 0.006 0.018 0.041 -0.043 -0.006 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.032) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) 
Three years of exposure -0.045 -0.029 -0.026 -0.013 -0.052 -0.034 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.045) (0.039) (0.026) (0.022) 
Four years of exposure -0.037 -0.026 -0.034 0.005 -0.036 -0.044 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.058) (0.056) (0.04) (0.034) 
       
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample size 1636948 296675 1340273 
Number of schools 1434 275 1159 
    
First stage coefficient on IIT x one year of exposure 0.963 
 (0.001) 
0.974  
(0.002) 
0.960 
 (0.002) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x two years of exposure 0.931  
(0.002) 
0.946 
 (0.003) 
0.926 
 (0.003) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x three years of exposure 0.902  
(0.004) 
0.927  
(0.005) 
0.891 
 (0.005) 
First stage coefficient on IIT x four years of exposure 0.869 
 (0.007) 
0.889 
 (0.008) 
0.857 
 (0.011) 
    
 
 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates reported. Full controls are included (for gender, ethnicity, speaks English as first language, eligible for free schools meals, prior attainment, 
primary school). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at school level. 
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Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects, by Subject 
 
 All Schools Outstanding Non-Outstanding 
 Maths Reading Maths Reading Maths Reading 
       
A. Free school meal eligibility       
Yes -0.012 0.024 0.008 0.031 -0.018 0.022 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.047) (0.040) (0.024) (0.022) 
No -0.022 -0.003 -0.003 0.018 -0.029 -0.010 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014) 
B. Urban       
Yes -0.021 0.003 0.005 0.031 -0.030 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.032) (0.027) (0.018) (0.015) 
No -0.012 -0.006 -0.031 -0.029 -0.015 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.039) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020) 
C. Baseline School Size 
      
Treatment 0.166 0.060 0.382 0.159 0.103 0.041 
 (0.104) (0.093) (0.165) (0.17) (0.129) (0.111) 
Treatment*Baseline school size -0.032 -0.01 -0.065 -0.024 -0.023 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.03) (0.023) (0.020) 
D. Multi academy trust       
Yes 0.023 0.035 0.018 0.046 0.026 0.032 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.034) (0.030) (0.019) (0.016) 
No -0.064 -0.033 -0.020 -0.004 -0.082 -0.044 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.018) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates comparable to columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 9, but with mutually exclusive interactions included for panels A, B and 
D. Panel C reports estimates that interact treatment status with baseline (2006/07) school size (in logs). In terms of free school meal status, 
14% of pupils in the treated schools are eligible, 12% of pupils in outstanding treated schools are eligible, and 15% of pupils in non-
outstanding treated. For all treated schools in the sample 71% are in urban areas and 57% are in multi-academy trusts. The same numbers for 
outstanding and non-outstanding schools are: urban 72%/71%; multi-academy trusts 50%/59% respectively 
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Figure A1 
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Notes: as for figure 2. 
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Figure A2 
 
 
 
                                                                             Notes: as for figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
a
n
d
 9
5
%
 C
I
c-4 c-3 c-2 c-1 c c+1 c+2 c+3
Event Time (c=Academy Conversion)
Outstanding Non-Outstanding
2SLS Estimates by Ofsted Grade
Pupil Reading KS2 Performance
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PTE
D M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
50 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3 
 
 
 
                                                                     Notes: as for figure 3. 
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